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During its blitz of Lebanon in the sum-
mer of 2006, the Israeli military ravaged 
the neighbourhood of Haret Hreik in 
the southern suburbs of Beirut, razing 
to the ground or severely damaging 
265 residential, commercial, and office 
buildings, and displacing thousands 
of households in what Human Rights 
Watch described as Israeli “war crimes.”1 
But beyond the sheer tonnage of ordi-
nance targeting Haret Hreik was the 
symbolic violence attempting to erase 
the body politic which had produced 
this space. Paralleling the September 
11 attack on New York’s World Trade Center, the city was invoked by 
Israeli war planners as a party to the conflict; erasing a neighbourhood 
or a number of buildings amounted to undermining the life-support 
of an enemy, in this case Hizbullah, which had established its national 
headquarters in the neighbourhood. 
Reflecting on the September 11 attacks and the events that ensued, 
David Harvey proposed to conceptualize the city as a body politic 
which can be attacked, wounded, remoulded, or rebuilt.2 This meta-
phor, Harvey argued, provides an interesting entry point to examine 
the relation between processes of urban production and the (neces-
sarily contested) governance of the city. It directs analysis towards the 
political choices taken as this body politic was historically created and 
how, once formed, such a body politic confronts various challenges. A 
year after the “July War,” as it is commonly called in Lebanon, this essay 
offers reflections on the current post-war reconstruction, builds on the 
metaphor of the city as a body politic, and places the events of the 
summer 2006 in a historical context which traces some of the processes 
in which Haret Hreik3 came to boast a powerful body politic and how 
this body politic responded to the Israeli assaults. 
Formation of a spatial body politic
As a neighbourhood, Haret Hreik witnessed a major transformation 
during the first years of the Lebanese civil war (1975–1983), when Bei-
rut’s division in two antagonistic and religiously homogenous units 
resulted in ousting the majority of its primarily Christian dwellers. 
Haret Hreik and surrounding areas be-
came the refuge of thousands of Shiite 
families displaced from other quarters 
of the city or from the country’s south 
that had fallen under Israeli occupation 
in 1978.4 During this decade, it rapidly 
transformed from a green, low density 
suburban neighbourhood into a con-
gested area where most construction 
violated urban regulations that dictat-
ed moderate land exploitation ratios. 
This urbanization was controlled by a 
handful of developers and was fuelled 
by the desire to accumulate capital and 
by dire housing needs in a war-torn and unaffordable city.
The formation of a popular social and cultural foundation that could 
sustain an Islamic political movement capable of military resistance to 
Israel’s occupation of South Lebanon probably began with the estab-
lishment of the Hawzas (or religious study groups) around 19845 and 
continued soon after, and in the face of neglect by the state authorities, 
with the organization of service provision in the southern suburbs of 
Beirut (e.g. garbage collection, drinking water provision, maintenance 
of sewer systems). During the late 1980s–early 1990s, Hizbullah’s po-
litical headquarters and the main offices of an array of social organiza-
tions affiliated to it were established in Haret Hreik. Over time, many 
linkages were created between this social and political organization 
and the neighbourhood, generating an “economy of Islamic resistance” 
there.
These developments modified the character of the neighbourhood. 
For one, Hizbullah’s security apparatus gradually imposed itself: streets 
surrounding the main political headquarters (Majlis al-Shura) were 
gated to form its “security quarters” (murabba‘ al-amni); armed security 
staff began patrolling in front of the houses and offices of its leaders; 
researchers and journalists visiting the neighbourhood were required 
to obtain special permits from the Party; and visitors were frequent-
ly questioned about their business there. Culturally and socially, the 
neighbourhood began to display the political and religious orienta-
tion of the community supporting Hizbullah, with the closure of liquor 
stores, night restaurants, bars, movie houses, and other entertainment 
considered immoral. Furthermore, neighbourhood streets were plas-
tered with signs and posters celebrating the presence of the Islamic 
Resistance and its martyred heroes while advertisement billboards 
conformed to religious guidelines. Many streets were renamed after 
heroes and martyrs of the Islamic Resistance. Similarly, people increas-
ingly adopted a religious dress code, and apartment buildings began 
to be fitted with curtains to shield household interiors from eyes in 
neighbouring buildings. I do not mean to suggest, as it is sometimes 
claimed, that Haret Hreik was hence “Hizbullah territory.” Like every-
where else, space is the subject of contention and resistance to this 
appropriation was visible everywhere. Yet, the Islamic resistance had 
clearly taken root, deeply altering the character of the neighbourhood 
and delineating it as a space in the city with a clear identity.
Reconstruction of Haret Hreik
In this context, authority over reconstruction of Haret Hreik this past 
year carried more symbolism than anywhere else in Lebanon and was 
hotly contested. The central government immediately announced its 
intention to take charge, as declarations abounded about ending “years 
of a state within a state” in reference to Hizbullah’s control over par-
ticular areas in Lebanon. On the other hand, Hizbullah’s leader, Sayyed 
Hasan Nasrallah also made a public “solemn” promise that Haret Hreik 
will be rebuilt “more beautiful than it was” and Hizbullah’s members 
Israeli bombs completely destroyed Beirut’s 
neighbourhood Haret Hreik in the summer 
of 2006. Because Hizbullah’s headquarters 
is located in the neighbourhood, Israeli 
war planners considered its destruction of 
particular symbolic and strategic relevance. For 
the same reasons, authority of reconstruction 
carried heightened symbolism and led to 
contestation between the central government 
and Hizbullah. In the intersection of these 
two powerful actors there remains little 
room for local residents to have a voice in the 
re-organization of their living spaces. 
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involving architects of several confessions in re-drawing the buildings, 
the actual decision about the modalities of reconstruction were taken 
early on by the political party who determined that there will be no de-
densification of the area and that the overall reconstruction will gener-
ally reproduce the pre-war fabric and its concomitant problems of poor 
ventilation, little natural lighting, and absence of public space. 
Moreover, local actors have been excluded from this reconstruction 
planning. This includes the Haret Hreik Municipality which, though 
closely allied to Hizbullah, has been sidelined from the project’s mak-
ing; none of its members were included in the plan formulation and 
it has no representative in Waad. Furthermore, the Municipality’s ef-
forts to improve the urban fabric of the neighbourhood by introducing 
more changes than was dictated by Hizbullah’s central political author-
ity were dismissed and have hence been abandoned. The same can be 
said about neighbourhood dwellers, 85% of whom have already signed 
documents conferring legal authority over collecting their compen-
sation and constructing their new apartments to Hizbullah.7 Among 
these dwellers are some of the developers who were historically cred-
ited for building the neighbourhood but have now lost authority over 
its making. Asked about why they have opted to sign away their legal 
rights, those interviewed argued that they had no choice in the current 
political context. 
A legal proposition
Despite their differences, Hizbullah and the central government 
agree on the legal framework in which reconstruction will occur. The 
cabinet has already approved a legal proposal in principle which pro-
vides a temporary and exceptional permit for the dwellers to rebuild 
their houses “as they were,” even if in violation of current public urban 
and building regulations. If this arrangement is approved by the leg-
islative body, dwellers will obtain a short-term entitlement to build 
“illegal” houses, while the exclusive urban planning framework that 
generated this illegality in the first place will not be revised. These 
citizens are hence tolerated rather than accepted and granted a lower-
than-normal entitlement to participate in the production of the city.8 
In the context of the southern suburbs of Beirut, 
an area that has been historically stigmatized as 
“illegal” and largely condemned in popular press 
and public discourse as such,9 a truncated entitle-
ment strengthens the community’s perception 
that it is unwanted in the city and that it needs 
solid political backing in order to retain the pre-
carious entitlement it has obtained. As a result, 
the community’s dependence on Shiite political 
parties who are able to provide this backing is 
strengthened further while its relation with the 
state continues to be mediated through these po-
litical parties. Conversely, public agents are able 
to, whenever they see fit, recite the refrain of “il-
legality”… every time they opt to attack political 
opposition through the window of the “illegal” 
communities they protect.10 
A new body politic?
So what do the events of the past year tell us 
about how the body politic responded to the 
Israeli attack? It is certainly premature to draw 
conclusions but, one year later, it seems that the 
threatened body politic has responded by further 
reducing the spaces of contestation. In attempt-
ing to re-secure a home in the city, dwellers have 
to manoeuvre in the intersection of two power-
ful actors whose respective approaches to urban 
governance have concurred to foreclose their 
possibilities for taking charge of the making and 
organization of their living spaces. 
recurrently described a prompt reconstruction of the neighbourhood 
as another “victory” for the Party. Many wondered in the months that 
followed the war how this reconstruction would play itself out, espe-
cially in the context of an ongoing political standoff between the gov-
ernment and a Hizbullah-led opposition which has suspended central 
government agencies and the Parliament since November 2006. 
As a planner, urban researcher, and citizen of this city I became inter-
ested in how this conflict influenced the ability of residents to take part 
in the reconstruction of their neighbourhood. The issues presented 
here emerged from my ongoing interaction with the neighbourhood 
and my frustration vis-à-vis the governance of a post-war reconstruc-
tion which I have come to believe forecloses the opportunities for pub-
lic debate and for dwellers to intervene as partners in their making of 
their living environment. 
The position of the state
A public commission was established in the days following the war 
and included representatives from public planning agencies and local 
political parties (including Hizbullah). This commission was however 
rapidly caught in the wider political standoff: it only met a few times 
and its final recommendations were never adopted. Faithful to a neo-
liberal tradition in public governance that conceptualizes the role of 
the public actor as an entrepreneur whose task is to attract foreign in-
vestment rather than as a manager of space or a service provider, the 
central government retracted developing reconstruction plans for the 
area when it became clear that Hizbullah would stand in the way of 
any redevelopment plan that could displace dwellers. The Council for 
Development and Reconstruction, the central planning agency in the 
country that had orchestrated much of the post-civil war reconstruc-
tion, was sidelined directly by the Prime Minister’s office in favour of 
the Higher Relief Commission. Thus, the state conceptualized its role in 
reconstruction as “relief”; its involvement would be limited to paying 
(rather generous) financial compensation to those who had lost their 
homes, while the management of reconstruction would be left to indi-
vidual homeowners and contractors. Hence, there will be no strategy 
to conceptualize or compensate for damage to the public domain or 
to introduce direly needed open and communal spaces that form the 
heart of any community.6 This was well in line with the post-civil war 
reconstruction of the country where public efforts were concentrated 
in large-scale developmental projects (e.g. redevelopment of Beirut 
downtown, the construction of an international airport) while social 
policy was essentially reduced to paying indemnities to households 
displaced during the war. 
In the months that followed, even relief proved to be more chal-
lenging than expected. Compensation was delayed as the legal re-
quirements for establishing clear ownership titles clashed with the 
grey zones of real life where multiple inheritances in large families 
and unprofessional market developments produced discrepancies in 
national property records. Furthermore, the reconstruction still lacks 
a legal framework: while most dwellers had adjusted their buildings’ 
legal status in 1994 by virtue of a regularization law and in exchange of 
penalties, they are not entitled to rebuild outside building regulations 
if these buildings are demolished. New planning regulations have to 
be issued if reconstruction is to proceed without dramatically de-pop-
ulating the area. These however require approvals from the Parliament 
which has been suspended by the political standoff. 
The Hizbullah project
Meanwhile, history continues to repeat itself in Beirut’s suburbs as 
Hizbullah emerges as the planning body developing the neighbour-
hood’s reconstruction plan. The party has established a private devel-
opment company named Waad (or Promise) in reference to the com-
mitment made by Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah to rebuild Haret Hreik for 
its community. Six architects, all of them university professors with 
no necessary affiliation to the party, were asked to develop a recon-
struction plan with firm instructions not to change the fabric, density, 
and general organization of the neighbourhood. It is on the basis of 
this plan that Waad has now commissioned a number of architectural 
offices to redesign buildings, with strict criteria to observe the same 
footprints, building heights, and lot boundaries for every building, thus 
replicating the environment that was generated by profit-driven proc-
esses during the years of civil war. While Waad goes the extra-mile to 
present an image of religious inclusiveness and open-mindedness by 
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